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In M em oriam
With the death of John 
D. Harper on July 26, 1985, the 
Public Oversight Board and the 
accounting profession lost a staunch 
supporter of self-regulation.
As a charter member of 
the Board, Mr. Harper's extensive 
executive abilities were especially 
useful to the Board in its formative 
years as it established its program of 
oversight of the accounting profes­
sion's bold experiment at self­
regulation.
Jo hn  D. H arper 
April 6, 1910-July 26, 1985
His perspective of the ac­
counting profession, based on his 
broad experience as an executive, 
director; and especially as a member 
of corporate audit committees, helped 
the Board resolve many complex 
policy and procedural issues.
The Board wishes to record 
its deep sense of personal loss at the 
passing of a friend and colleague and 
its appreciation for the contributions 
John Harper made during his seven 
years as a valued Board member.
PUBLIC OVERSIGHT BOARD
------------------------SEC Practice Section • AICPA -----------------------
540 Madison Avenue • New York 10022 • (212) 486-2448
June 30, 1985
To Member Firms of the SEC Practice Section,
Securities and Exchange Commission, and 
Other Interested Parties
It is my pleasure to transmit this seventh annual report of the Public Oversight Board.
The 1984-85 year was one in which continued progress was made by the accounting profession in its 
self-regulatory program. The successful peer review program was further strengthened through 
modification of standards and procedures. More significantly, the Section offered the SEC access 
through the offices of the Board to information on cases closed by the Special Investigations 
Committee. While details have not been completed, the Board hopes that such access will provide 
the SEC a basis to form an independent opinion and endorse the special investigative process in 
much the same way as it has endorsed the peer review process.
The past year, however, also saw a significant increase in the number of allegations of failure in 
audits, especially in audits of financial institutions. These highly publicized cases were in large part 
responsible for the initiation of Congressional hearings regarding the credibility of financial 
statements and the auditor’s report thereon. The Board does not believe that additional federal 
regulation of the accounting profession is necessary and so testified during those hearings.
Nevertheless, the events of the past year suggest that the profession cannot become complacent 
with the success the self-regulatory program has achieved to date but must closely examine all 
aspects of the program in the light of recent events. Our report includes a number of suggestions 
which we have communicated to the Section, including the need to increase public awareness of 
the program and to educate the public regarding the difference between a business failure and an 
audit failure. The Board has full confidence, based on the commitment to self-regulation already 
evidenced by the Section and its members, that whatever is necessary to be done to strengthen 
the program will in fact be done.
Very truly yours,
A rthur M. W o o d  
Chairman
Public Oversight Board
Robert K. M autz
A. A. So m m e r , Jr.
Vice Chairman
A rthur M . W o o d
Chairman
M elvin R. Laird
Jo h n  D. H arper
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6Report on the Board's 
1984-85 Oversight Activities
In setting up its self-regulatory pro­gram for accounting firms— described briefly in the accompanying box en­titled "The Accounting Profession’s Self-Regulatory Program"—the American Institute 
of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) and those 
with statutory oversight believed it essential that 
a process organized and administered by the pro­
fession be subjected to oversight and review by 
an independent body representing the public 
interest. Thus, provision was made for a board of 
five experienced and independent individuals 
not engaged in independent public accounting to 
oversee the operations of the SEC Practice Section 
(SECPS). Brief biographies of Board members ap­
pear on pages 26-29.
Initially, members of the Public Oversight 
Board (POB) were appointed by the Board of 
Directors of the AICPA and it was intended that 
their replacements would be so appointed. How­
ever, to further assure its independence, a change 
was made in 1978 to give the POB the right to 
appoint its own successors in consultation with 
and subject to the approval of the AICPA Board of 
Directors. After further consideration, in 1985, an­
other change was made so that the POB now acts 
independently on its own appointments, com­
pensation, and all other decisions. As Chairman 
Wood told the AICPA Council in May 1985,1 how­
ever, the changes were not required because the 
Board and its individual members have always 
felt completely independent.
Responsibilities and Functions
The Board is charged with the respon­
sibility for monitoring and evaluating the activities 
and decisions of the Section’s committees and 
conducting continuous oversight of all other ac­
tivities of the Section. It also has responsibilities 
to make recommendations for improvement in
the operation of the Section and to publish an 
annual report and any such other reports as it may 
deem necessary with respect to its activities and 
those of the Section.
Role of the Board
The role of the Board is to represent the 
public interest and to assure that this is not ne­
glected when the Section sets standards, mem­
bership requirements, and rules and procedures.
The Board does not believe that its com­
mitment to the public interest places it in conflict 
with the best interests of the accounting profes­
sion. The accounting profession serves the public 
interest in a particular manner— the enhance­
ment of the credib ility of financial statements 
which issuers and debtors prepare and which in­
vestors and creditors, as well as governmental 
authorities, rely upon. The Board, and the pro­
gram which it oversees, exist to give additional 
assurance that the accounting profession per­
forms, and is perceived to perform, the role which 
society accords it. Unless the accounting profes­
sion satisfies society that it is performing this role, 
society will seek other means of giving financial 
information the reliability needed in an economy 
which relies upon credit and private investors for 
its viability.
The Board does not have line authority. 
Nevertheless, the Board and its staff have played 
major roles in the development and refinement of 
the policies, standards, and operations of the Sec­
tion. In addition, it has influenced the develop­
ment of professional standards. Some of the 
Board's major contributions during the past year 
are identified in other sections of this report.
Activities of the Board
The Board actively monitors all aspects of
1. See Exhibit I for full text of Chairman Wood's address to the Spring Meeting of 
AICPA Council, Scottsdale, Arizona, May, 1985.
7the self-regulatory program administered by the 
Section. The Board is assisted by a staff of four 
CPAs and two administrative personnel. Richard A. 
Stark, a partner in the New York law firm of 
Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy, has served as 
the Board’s legal counsel since its inception.
The Board meets monthly to consider is­
sues as they arise and to review events since the 
last meeting.
Congressional Hearings
In February 1985, the Subcommittee on 
Oversight and Investigations of the House Com­
mittee on Energy and Commerce, chaired by Rep­
resentative John D. Dingell (D., Mich.) began a 
series of hearings on "Oversight of the Accounting 
Profession and the Securities and Exchange Com­
mission: Effectiveness, Independence, and Regu-
The Accounting Profession's Self-Regulatory Program
During the course of the Congressional hearings on 
the accounting profession in 1977 and 1978, concern 
was expressed about, among other things, the quality 
of the auditing services provided by public accounting 
firms in this country. In response to these concerns, in 
1977 the American Institute of Certified Public 
Accountants created a new organization to improve 
the quality of service provided by these firms— a 
Division for CPA Firms consisting of two sections, an 
SEC Practice Section and a Private Companies Practice 
Section.2
■ Membership Requirements. Firms that join either 
section commit themselves to adhere to rigorous 
membership requirements, including peer review and 
continuing professional education. The SECPS also 
has requirements regarding partner rotation and 
second partner review on audits of public companies, 
the reporting to the Section of litigation and govern­
ment action alleging failure in the conduct of an audit 
of a publicly-held company and the reporting of 
serious disagreements with management to the client 
company’s board of directors.
A fundamental membership requirement of both 
sections is that firms commit themselves to adhere to 
quality control standards enunciated by the AICPA, 
which assure that member firms meet high profes­
sional standards in all aspects of their accounting and 
auditing practice.
■ Levels of Regulation of Accountants. The peer 
regulatory program administered by the Division for 
CPA Firms is but one facet of the overall regulatory 
program of the AICPA, which includes, among other 
activities, the setting of ethical, auditing, and quality 
control standards. Regulation of professional practice 
is applied at two other levels: by individual account­
ing firms and by government. These three levels of 
regulation use means commensurate with their differ­
ing purposes and powers to achieve their common 
goal of enhanced audit quality. Together, the three
provide a coordinated program of regulation of 
accountants and accounting.
Individual accounting firms provide the first line 
of defense against unsatisfactory audit practice. First, 
they establish internal systems of quality control 
designed to ensure compliance with professional 
standards and, if applicable, SEC rules and other legal 
requirements in the conduct of their accounting and 
auditing practice. Second, they establish programs of 
internal inspection to ascertain possible failures of 
compliance with their systems of quality control.
Third, they take disciplinary and remedial steps 
against partners and staff members judged to be 
inadequate in performance of their professional 
responsibilities.
Regulation imposed by the government includes 
qualifying examinations, licensing provisions and 
other regulatory requirements to assure reliable 
service by accountants to the public. The government 
has the final authority to punish accountants who fail 
to comply with legal standards of performance and 
does so through imposition of punitive measures such 
as public censure, injunction, and temporary or 
permanent suspension from practice before the SEC 
or by state licensing boards. In addition, civil litigation 
pursued within the government’s legal system may 
result in damage awards against auditors which are 
often substantial in amount.
In contrast to the roles played by government 
regulation and private regulation, peer regulation by 
the AICPA Division for CPA Firms is not directed to 
identifying, convicting, and punishing those who fail to 
meet established requirements; rather, it is preven­
tive in nature. In line with its powers and authority, it 
focuses on strengthening systems of quality control 
and improving the effective performance of member 
firms through reviews to discover whether they 
comply with membership requirements, ethical stan­
dards, and professional standards.
2. The nature and scope of the accounting profession's self-regulatory program more fully described in Audit Quality. The Profession's Program published in 1984 
and the way in which the program combines with other regulatory efforts is by the Public Oversight Board.
8lation of Corporate Audits.”
Board Chairman Wood and Board Vice 
Chairman Sommer presented written and oral tes­
timony to the Committee in April, explaining the 
Section’s self-regulatory program and the Board’s 
oversight thereof.
The hearings are expected to continue at 
least until the fall of 1985. As Chairman Wood 
reported to the Committee: "We are observing 
closely your hearings. From them, we hope to gain 
further insights into the circumstances that have 
caused the perception in many quarters that there 
are deficiencies in the audit process in this coun­
try. Out of these insights we expect to develop 
new procedures and safeguards to further reduce 
the possibility of 'bad’ audits occurring, notwith­
standing the earnest efforts of us and so many 
members of the accounting profession to 
strengthen the quality of audits and the systems 
of quality control that have been welded together 
for many years, especially the last eight.”3
Oversight of the Peer Review Process
The Board monitors the activities of the 
Peer Review Committee, including reports on in­
dividual peer reviews as well as the setting of, 
revisions to, and enforcement of standards. Mem­
bers of the Board and its staff attended each of the 
seven full-day meetings held by the Committee, 
eight meetings of its Evaluations and Recom­
mendations Subcommittee, and seven full-day 
meetings held by its various task forces. In addi­
tion, the Board’s staff reviews every peer review 
performed; it attends many of the exit con­
ferences— the meeting at the conclusion of a peer 
review when the reviewers report their findings 
and recommendations to management of the re­
viewed firm—and members of the Board also 
periodically attend such meetings. Any problem 
the staff has with the conduct of a review or a re­
port— if they think it is too harsh or too lenient— is 
brought to the attention of the Board. While the 
Board does not have the power to overrule a 
decision of the authorities in the Section, the 
Board’s experience has been that the Section re­
considers its decision when the Board makes its 
views known. The Section often adopts the 
Board’s recommendations. In other cases, the 
Board accepts the logic of the position taken by
the Section.
Each review is subjected to one of three 
levels of Board oversight: (1) observing the per­
formance of the field work, attending the exit 
conference and reviewing the review team ’s 
workpapers, report, letter of comments, and the 
reviewed firm’s letter of response; (2) reviewing
CHART A. Scope of Board Oversight of 1984 Peer Reviews 
Classified by Number of SEC Clients of Reviewed 
Firms
No. of Firms
Percent
3. Testimony on Behalf of the Public Oversight Board before the Subcommittee 
on Oversight and Investigations of the House Committee on Energy and 
Commerce, March 6, 1985.
9the review team’s workpapers, the report, and the 
letters issued; or (3) reviewing selected reviewers’ 
workpapers, the report, and the letters issued. 
During the past year, the Board observed reviews 
in process for all firms with five or more SEC 
clients and, based on selected criteria, visited a 
number of firms with fewer than five SEC clients 
and a representative number of firms with no SEC 
clients. Chart A summarizes this phase of the 
Board’s oversight.
The Board finds its access to the peer re­
view activities of the Section entirely satisfactory 
for discharge of its oversight responsibilities. Dis­
cussion at Committee meetings is free and frank, 
and Board members and its staff have adequate 
opportunity to express their views and to receive 
responses to such expressions. The Board is con­
vinced that the peer review program is functioning 
effectively and accomplishing the purposes for 
which intended.
Oversight of the Special Investigative Process
The other major element of the Section’s 
program is the special investigative process. A 
member firm is obligated to report promptly to 
the Special Investigations Committee (SIC) litiga­
tion and governmental proceedings directed 
against it that allege deficiencies in the conduct of 
an audit of a client in which there is a significant 
public interest, defined, generally speaking, as a 
client that files financial statements with the SEC 
or certain other federal regulatory agencies in 
connection with the sale or trading of its securities.
As with the peer review activity of the Sec­
tion, the Board and its staff actively monitor all 
activities of the Special Investigations Committee 
and its task forces. The Board has unrestricted 
access to all Committee meetings and files. Mem­
bers of the Board’s staff read, for each reported 
case, all pertinent financial statements, other pub­
lic documents, related correspondence, and rele­
vant professional literature. For each reported 
case, Board members receive a copy of a summary 
of the allegations, which identifies the accounting, 
auditing, and quality control issues involved and 
applicable professional standards, as well as 
information and comments developed by the 
Board’s staff in carrying out its oversight functions. 
These papers serve as the basis for questions and
discussion at Board meetings.
Members of the Board and its staff at­
tended each of the seven full-day meetings held 
by the Committee during the year and attended 
most of the 30 meetings held by SIC task forces 
with firm representatives to discuss allegations in 
reported cases or with peer reviewers to discuss 
peer review findings that may have been relevant 
to allegations made in reported cases. Addi­
tionally, during 1984-85, the Board’s staff evaluated 
the activities of the two SIC task forces and review 
teams that performed special reviews. The staff 
also visited the offices of the two member firms 
being reviewed during the course of the special 
reviews, reviewed the workpapers prepared in 
connection therewith, discussed the findings and 
their quality control implications with appropriate 
parties, and attended meetings at which the find­
ings of the review team were communicated to 
representatives of the reviewed firm.
Based on its extensive monitoring, the 
Board concludes that the Committee has effective 
operational procedures, and that the Committee’s 
decisions are well-reasoned and in the interest of 
the public and the profession.
The Board is concerned that the special 
investigative process has not yet achieved cred­
ibility equal to that attained by the peer review 
process. This is largely due to the confidentiality 
of the Committee’s activities rather than to any 
weakness in its purpose or procedures. Because 
of concern for possible prejudice to both plaintiffs 
and defendants in private and governmental pro­
ceedings, the Section determined that details of 
the Committee’s proceedings and conclusions on 
individual cases would not be publicly disclosed. 
Consistent with the Section’s concerns, the Board 
only reports aggregate information about the ac­
tivities of this Committee.
Summary
The Public Oversight Board was estab­
lished by the American Institute of Certified Pub­
lic Accountants as a means of giving further 
assurance that the quality control requirements 
imposed by it on firms which voluntarily chose to 
subject themselves to those requirements were 
met. The Board, consisting of five members, none 
of whom is engaged in the practice of accounting
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and three of whom have had no professional asso­
ciation with the accounting profession, has estab­
lished a program to oversee the quality control 
efforts of the Section. The Board believes that this 
program is effectively designed to accomplish its 
purpose. Based upon its oversight of the work 
done under that program, the Board has con­
cluded that during the 1985 fiscal year the quality 
control program was effectively implemented and 
that it provided significant assurance that firms 
participating in the program had in place, and 
complied with, quality control systems which pro­
vide reasonable assurance that audits would be 
done in accordance with generally accepted audit­
ing standards.
This is not to say, of course, that a program 
less than a decade old cannot be improved. As 
indicated in what follows, the Board and others 
have identified improvements which should be 
considered. We are confident that those respon­
sible for the implementation of the program 
will make the changes that are necessary to 
strengthen the program and provide even greater 
asssurance that the audits of publicly-held com­
panies and other companies of public concern are 
conducted in accordance with the highest prac­
ticable standards.
Board members discussing annual report for 1984-85. Left to right. Vice Chairman A. A. Sommer, Jr., Robert K. Mautz, Board counsel Richard A. Stark, Chairm an A rthur M . 
Wood, John D. Harper, and Melvin R. Laird.
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Peer Review Activity
 In calendar 1984, 167 member firms 
were required to undergo a peer re­
view; of these, 136 were firms that had 
previously been peer reviewed and 
31 were firms that submitted their quality control 
system to peer review for the first time. One re­
view was a full-scope review performed prior to 
the expiration of the affected firm’s normal three- 
year cycle, because the previous review had dis­
closed quality control system deficiencies requir­
ing extensive corrective action by the firm. One 
hundred fifty-three peer review reports were ac­
cepted by the Committee as of June 30, 1985. 
Processing of the reports on the remaining 14 
reviews was deferred pending resolution of cer­
tain matters to the satisfaction of the Committee 
or its staff.
The peer review process is detailed in the 
box on page 12.
Types of Reports Issued
As indicated in Chart B, over 90 percent of 
the firms reviewed in 1984 received an unqualified 
opinion, the majority of which were accompanied 
by a letter of comments. As in past years, firms 
receiving an unqualified opinion without a letter 
of comments are firms with a limited accounting 
and auditing practice for which a relatively simple 
system of quality control is appropriate. Approx­
imately 8 percent of the firms reviewed in 1984 
received qualified opinions and two of the reports 
issued on 1984 reviews were adverse. Reports on 
all reviews completed in 1984 are included in 
Chart B classified by the type of report issued by 
the reviewer and/or based upon the preliminary 
evaluation made by the Committee’s and POB's 
staffs of the peer reviewer’s findings.
The majority of firms reviewed in 1984 
were also reviewed in 1981 under the three-year 
rotation policy. As indicated in Chart B, results of 
reviews performed in 1984 indicated a substantial
improvement over results of reviews performed 
in 1981.
CHART B. Types of Reports Issued on 203 Peer Reviews Per­
formed in 1981 and on 167 Peer Reviews Per­
formed in 1984
Percent 1981 1984
An analysis of the types of reports re­
ceived by the 136 firms peer reviewed in both 1981 
and 1984 shows that 115 firms received the same
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type of report in 1984 as they did in 1981, 15 firms 
received a better report, and six firms received a 
more critical report in 1984. Comparison of the 
letters of comments for 1981 and 1984 indicates 
that most, if not all, of the firms that received 
unqualified reports both in 1981 and 1984 also had 
improved their quality control systems in the 
three-year period. The number, nature, and fre­
quency of deficiencies reported in 1984 letters of 
comments were considerably less than those re­
ported in 1981. However, it is our belief, based on 
our oversight program, that reviewers have gradu­
ally increased the rigor of their examinations over
the years. Details are shown in Table 1.
The one firm that received adverse opin­
ions on its 1981 and 1984 reviews was requested by 
the Committee to take specified corrective ac­
tions in 1984, including the engaging of a qualified 
person, acceptable to the Committee, to perform 
preissuance reviews of audit workpapers and re­
ports. The firm has refused to do so, and the 
Committee has initiated proceedings to impose 
formal sanctions on the firm.
In another case, a firm initially refused to 
undergo an accelerated review as a condition of 
continued membership in the Section and steps
The Peer Review Process
Peer review is the cornerstone of the profession’s self- 
regulatory program. Once every three years a member 
firm must have the quality control system for its 
accounting and auditing practice reviewed and pub­
licly reported on by an independent third party. The 
public report on an accounting firm’s system of quality 
control may be unqualified, qualified, or adverse.
The review may be conducted by another mem­
ber firm, by a team appointed by the Peer Review 
Committee, by a team assembled by an association of 
CPA firms to which the reviewed member firm 
belongs, or by a team assembled by a state CPA 
society. To qualify to administer peer reviews for its 
members, an association must have its administrative 
plan approved by the Peer Review Committee and 
have any common quality control items such as 
manuals and educational programs reviewed by an 
independent third party. Similarly, a state CPA society 
must have its administrative plan approved by the 
Committee. Currently, 10 associations and one state 
CPA society are authorized to administer peer reviews 
for members belonging to the SEC Practice Section.
A review covers the operations of a firm’s 
accounting and auditing practice over a one-year 
period. An unqualified report is issued when the 
reviewer concludes that the firm's quality control 
system is sufficiently comprehensive and suitably 
designed to meet the objectives of quality control 
standards and that its quality control policies and 
procedures were complied with during the year, thus 
providing the firm with reasonable assurance of 
conforming with professional standards.
A qualified report is issued when the reviewer 
concludes that there are significant deficiencies in the 
design of the firm’s quality control system, a signifi­
cant lack of compliance with its quality control 
policies and procedures, or a significant lack of 
compliance with membership requirements of the 
Section.
An adverse report is issued when the reviewer 
concludes that the firm’s quality control system is not 
sufficiently comprehensive or that its policies and 
procedures are not being complied with in a manner 
that provides the firm with reasonable assurance that 
it is complying with professional standards.
A substantial majority of firms receiving un­
qualified reports and all firms receiving qualified or 
adverse reports also receive letters of comments 
which report (1) deficiencies noted in the firm’s 
quality control system or in compliance by the firm’s 
personnel with its quality control policies and pro­
cedures and (2) recommendations for corrective 
action. The recommended corrective actions in a 
letter of comments issued with an unqualified report 
are intended to improve the effectiveness of the 
firm’s quality control system or compliance by its 
personnel with its quality control policies and pro­
cedures, but the identified deficiencies are not 
considered to be so serious as to negate the 
conclusion that the firm’s system provides it with 
reasonable assurance of complying with professional 
standards in the performance of its accounting and 
auditing engagements.
A firm is required to respond in writing to each 
item in the letter of comments stating the specific 
actions the firm has taken or intends to take with 
respect to each item listed or giving its reason for not 
doing so.
The Committee reviews the findings and the 
report issued on each review to ascertain whether the 
review was performed and reported on in accordance 
with standards and whether the reviewed firm is 
responsive to the reviewer’s findings and rec­
ommendations. If the Committee is satisfied with the 
report and the letters of comments and response, the 
report is accepted and it and the letters are placed in 
a file available for public inspection.
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TABLE 1 Comparison of Reports Received by Firms Peer Re­
viewed Both in 1981 and 1984
Number of Firms by Type of Report 
Number of Firms by Received in 1984
Type of Report
Received in 1981 Unqualified Qualified Adverse
Unqualified....... 117 111 6
Qualified...........  16 13 3
Adverse.............  3 1 1
136 125 10
leading to the possible imposition of a sanction 
were initiated. Such plans were cancelled when 
the firm in question submitted to the accelerated 
review mandated by the Committee. The report 
issued on the mandated review was unqualified 
since the firm had made the required improve­
ments in its quality control system.
As in past years, the Committee and its 
staff vigorously and equitably enforced the 
rigorous standards for performing and reporting 
on peer reviews. In this connection, the Commit­
tee deferred acceptance of 45 reports upon initial 
consideration. The primary reasons for deferral of 
action were:
■ The sample of engagements reviewed did not 
represent a reasonable cross-section of the firm's 
accounting and auditing practice; the reviewer 
was required to revisit the firm and review addi­
tional engagements.
■ The type of report and letter of comments is­
sued were not consistent with the deficiencies 
noted in the course of the review; the reviewer 
was asked to change the report and/or letter or to 
justify the type of report and letter issued.
■ Questions were unresolved as to whether one 
or more of the auditing engagements reviewed 
had been performed in compliance with profes­
sional standards; the reviewed firm was required 
to resolve such matters as a condition precedent 
to the processing of the report by the Committee.
Types of Reviewers
A firm can request that its review be per­
formed by a team assembled by the Committee,
another member firm, or an association or state 
CPA society authorized by the Committee to do 
so. A comparison of the types of review teams in 
1984 and 1981 indicates a trend toward selecting a 
member firm to perform a review rather than to 
request the Committee to appoint a team to do 
so. Over 61 percent of the firms undergoing re­
views in 1981 were reviewed by a committee- 
appointed review team (CART), whereas only 26 
percent of 1984 reviews were performed by 
CARTs. Forty-five percent of 1984 reviews were 
performed by member firms as shown in Chart C.
Substandard Performance on Individual 
Engagements
The Committee also deals with instances 
of substandard auditing and accounting perfor­
mance discovered on individual engagements 
during the peer review process. These are re­
ported promptly to the Committee. The Board’s 
staff found reviewers diligent in pursuing in­
stances of noncompliance with generally ac­
cepted accounting principles (GAAP) and gen­
erally accepted auditing standards (GAAS).
During 1984, peer reviewers reviewed the 
financial statements, reports, and workpapers for 
1,162 audit engagements, including audits of 260 
SEC registrants. Nineteen of these— or 1.6 percent 
of the number reviewed— were deemed to be 
substandard in the application of GAAP or GAAS; 
two of the nineteen were audits of SEC registrants.
In all five cases the financial statements 
were deemed not to have been prepared in accor­
dance with GAAP, the auditing firm immediately 
recalled its report and the financial statements 
and/or auditor’s report were reissued. None of 
these were SEC engagements.
In each instance where the peer reviewers 
concluded and the firm concurred that the audit 
had not been performed in accordance with 
GAAS, the firm either immediately performed the 
procedures that were considered necessary but 
not performed during the course of the audit or, 
because the next annual audit was imminent, 
agreed to perform such procedures in that audit. 
The unusually large number of non-GAAS engage­
ments not yet resolved to the satisfaction of the 
Committee is due to unusual circumstances; three 
of the engagements were performed by the firm
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CHART C. Types of Reviewers in 1981 and 1984
Reviews performed by com­
mittee-appointed-review 
teams (CARTs)
Reviews performed by an 
SECPS member firm se­
lected by the reviewed firm
Reviews performed under 
approved program admin­
istered by an association of 
CPA firms or state CPA society
against which the Committee has initiated sanc­
tion proceedings and four were performed by a 
firm whose adverse peer review report has not yet 
been processed by the Committee. In addition, 
the firms involved are no longer engaged as au­
ditor on three of these clients, including the SEC 
registrant. Details are shown in Table 2.
In each instance where substandard work 
was detected, the peer reviewer had to consider 
whether the firm’s quality control system failed to 
include policies and procedures that should have 
prevented the substandard work (a system de­
sign deficiency) or whether the substandard work 
resulted from noncompliance with existing pol­
icies and procedures (a "people problem”) and 
then recommend appropriate remedial measures 
in a letter of comments.
The 19 non-GAAP/non-GAAS engagements 
were performed by 10 different firms. Six of these 
firms received either a modified or adverse report 
because of the gravity of the deficiencies in their 
quality control systems. The four other firms re­
ceived unqualified reports with a letter of com-
TABLE 2 Corrective Action Required By SECPS Peer Review 
Committee with Respect to Substandard Audit 
Engagements Identified in Reviews Performed in 
1984
Number of Engagements 
Total SEC Non-SEC
Number of audit
engagements reviewed . . 1,162
Number of audit 
engagements considered 
substandard by peer 
reviewers........................  .....19
1.6%
Corrective Actions Required
Audit report recalled and 
financial statements and/ 
or report reissued...........  5
Omitted auditing
procedures performed . . .  7
Omitted auditing 
procedures—firm has not 
yet informed Committee 
of actions to be taken. . . .  7
260 902
2 17
0.8% 1.9%
0 5
1 6
1 6
1981 Reviews 1984 Reviews
124
(61%)
41
(20%) 38( 19%)
44
(26%)
75
(45%)
48
(29%)
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merits, because the reviewers concluded that the 
substandard work did not result from a system 
deficiency but rather from isolated noncom­
pliance by the firm's personnel. The Board and its 
staff closely reviewed each such instance in order 
to obtain assurance that an unqualified report was 
appropriate in the circumstances.
Additional Requirements Imposed by the 
Committee
During the year, the Committee took vari­
ous actions to obtain assurance that firms were 
effectively implementing corrective action plans 
in situations where the peer review had surfaced 
serious quality control deficiencies. Such actions 
required and monitored by the Committee con­
sisted of:
■ Revisits to 13 firms by the peer reviewer or a 
Committee member to assess the effectiveness of 
the firm’s corrective actions.
■ Obtaining copies from 16 firms of their annual 
inspection report and, in the case of three multi­
office firms, copies of the reports issued in con­
nection with inspection of certain of the firm’s 
individual practice units to assess the effec­
tiveness of the firm’s corrective action plans.
■ Requiring appointment, by each of three firms, 
of a qualified person acceptable to the Committee 
to direct the firm’s quality control program and to 
have such director periodically report results to 
the Committee; additionally, one such consultant 
was to perform a preissuance review on each audit 
of a public interest client.
The Committee also dealt effectively with 
substandard performance by peer reviewers, in­
cluding reviewing firms. As a case in point, the 
Committee concluded that review teams ap­
pointed by one firm for three peer reviews it was 
engaged to conduct did not perform the assigned 
reviews in accordance with standards. In response 
to being so advised by the Committee, the firm 
submitted a detailed plan for use by its personnel 
to assure that any future review engagements ac­
cepted by the firm would be performed and re­
ported on in accordance with standards. The 
Committee accepted the plan subject to satisfac­
tory implementation.
Monitoring of MAS Engagements
Member firms are required to report cer­
tain information regarding fees received for man­
agement advisory services (MAS) engagements, 
including MAS fees received from SEC registrants 
for whom the firm serves as auditor. Such informa­
tion is reported in the firm's annual report which is 
placed in the firm's public file. Analysis of the data 
reveals that for 97 percent of the SEC registrants 
audited by member firms, the firm either did not 
perform an MAS engagement for the registrant in 
1984, or, if it did so, the MAS fee was less than 26 
percent of the audit fee. Details are shown in 
Table 3; additional analyses of MAS fees are 
shown on pages 24-25.
TABLE 3 Analysis of Ratio of MAS Fees to Audit Fees Received 
in 1984 from SEC Registrants
IN umber of SEC Audit Clients Classified by
Number of Firms Percent of MAS Fee to Audit Fee
Classified by 
Number of 
SEC Clients 0-25%* 26-50% 51-100%
Over
100% Total
Firms ( 11) with 
100 or more SEC 
audit clients ... . 10,741 184 99 105 11,129
Firms (11) with 
20 to 99 SEC 
audit clients .... 562 9 5 1 577
Firms (169) with 
fewer than 20 
SEC audit clients 470 26 3 0 499
Totals 11,773 219 106 107 12,205
Percents 96.5% 1.8% 0.9% 0.9% 100%
*The Board has suggested that 0% be made a discrete category in future annual 
reports filed by member firms to make future analyses of these data more 
useful and less subject to misinterpretation.
The Section has been sensitive to critics 
who allege that performance of MAS engagements 
impairs auditor independence. Peer review stan­
dards require a team reviewing a firm that per­
forms both audit and MAS engagements for one or 
more SEC registrants to perform appropriate tests 
of whether the firm has:
■ Made objective accounting, auditing, and re­
porting decisions in performing the audit.
■ Complied with independence rules embodied 
in the AICPA Code of Ethics and its Statements on
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Standards for Management Advisory Services 
when performing MAS engagements.
■ Complied with the proscriptions relating to the 
performance of stipulated types of MAS engage­
ments.
■ Complied with the requirement to report to the 
audit committee or board of directors the amount 
of MAS fees received and the nature of services 
performed.
The performance of such procedures 
throughout the seven-year history of peer review 
has not brought forth any evidence (a) that serving 
in an MAS capacity has diluted a firm’s objectivity 
in performance of the audit function, or (b) that 
proscribed services have been performed.
Continuing Modification of Peer Review 
Standards and Procedures
A number of improvements were made in 
the peer review process during the year, several in 
response to suggestions made by the Board. The 
changes, which are expected to further enhance 
the quality of peer review performance and re­
porting, include measures dealing with:
■ The qualifications of reviewing firms and team 
captains.
■ The reporting implications of deficient offices in 
a multioffice firm in which firm-wide compliance is 
otherwise acceptable.
■ The resolution of disagreements between a re­
view team and the Committee.
■ The consideration that should be given to litiga­
tion in selecting engagements for review.
■ Increasing consistency in the evaluation of and 
reporting on deficiencies discovered in peer 
reviews.
In addition, the Board has recommended 
that peer review reports include a reference to 
related letters of comments, when these exist, and 
that additional consideration be given to clarifying 
the purpose and extent of second partner review 
and the responsibilities of those performing this 
function. Both of these matters are under consid­
eration by the Section as of the date of this report.
A Joint Task Force on Uniformity of Report­
ing, consisting of members of the Peer Review 
Committees of both sections, has held several 
meetings, all of which have been attended by 
Board staff, and is in the process of developing 
proposals to the respective committees regarding 
revisions to and clarification of existing standards 
and guidelines.
SEC Oversight of the Process
The SEC independently evaluates the 
peer review process of the Section, including the 
effectiveness of Board oversight. The SEC staff has 
begun its inspection of the 1984 reviews but has 
not yet concluded its inspection since its sample 
of reviews selected for such inspection has not yet 
been fully processed by the Committee. The 
Board understands that the SEC staff has indi­
cated that it is satisfied with both peer review and 
oversight performance on the reviews inspected 
to date.
17
Activities of the 
Special Investigations Committee
As a result of a recommendation emanat­
ing from an intensive review of the 
structure and operations of the Sec­
tion by a special review committee of 
accountants and nonaccountants (the SECPS Spe­
cial Review Committee), the Section published in 
May 1985 its first Report on the Activities of the Special 
Investigations Committee of the SEC Practice Section of the 
AICPA Division for CPA Firms. The Board believes 
this report increases the awareness of how the 
special investigative process operates— de­
scribed in the accompanying box entitled "The 
Special Investigative Process"—and what that 
part of the profession’s self-regulatory program 
has accomplished, and encourages the Section to 
publish comprehensive annual reports covering 
all its activities.
Cases Reported
Member firms reported 46 new cases dur­
ing the year ended June 30, 1985. In addition, the 
Committee reopened its files on one case pre­
viously closed because of new developments in 
the case. A summary of the Committee’s activity 
during the year is shown in Table 4.
In April 1985, the Executive Committee 
amended the membership requirements so that 
member firms are now required to report litiga­
tion alleging failure in the conduct of an audit of 
selected non-SEC clients. Details are reported on 
pages 21 and 22.
Special Reviews
Based upon its analysis of data gathered in the 
initial investigative stage, the Committee re­
quired two firms to submit to a special review. The 
review of each firm focused on engagements per­
formed by the personnel involved in the reported 
case and on certain types of engagements per-
TABLE 4 Special Investigations Committee Activity During 
the Year Ended tune 30, 1985
Number of Cases
Undergoing
Initial
Investigative
Procedures
In
Monitoring
Undergoing
Special
Review
Status of cases
at July 1, 1984...................... 14 6 6
Activity during the year:
New cases added.......
Case reopened...........
Cases transferred to: 
Monitoring...............
46
1
(11) 11
Special rev iew ....... ( 2) 2
Cases closed............... (27) ( 7)
Status of cases
at June 30, 1985 ................. 21 10 2
formed by that office for clients in the same 
industry.
On one of the special reviews, the Commit­
tee’s task force appointed a review team com­
posed of experienced professionals drawn from 
several member firms. On the other special re­
view, the Committee’s task force used the firm that 
had served as the peer reviewer for the subject 
firm. The scope of each review was determined by 
the Committee's assigned task force. The mem­
bers of both review teams had extensive review 
experience within their individual firms, recent 
experience in the peer review process, expert 
knowledge of quality control systems, and exper­
tise in the industries of the engagements selected 
for review. Both review teams performed under 
the direct on-site supervision of the task force 
assigned to the case. As of June 30, 1985, both 
special reviews were still in process.
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Corrective Actions of Firms
Typically, a firm which has been named as a
defendant in private or governmental litigation 
undertakes on its own initiative a review of the 
engagement alleged not to have been performed
The Special Investigative Process
Member firms are required to report to the Special 
Investigations Committee each instance of litigation or 
proceeding (case) against them or members of their 
firms involving allegations of failure in the conduct of 
an audit of the financial statements of an SEC 
registrant or a bank or other lending institution filing 
periodic reports with other federal regulatory agen­
cies. The Committee reviews the allegations in each 
case and considers whether they may indicate a need 
for improvements in the quality control system of the 
reporting firm or improved compliance with its quality 
control policies and procedures. Additionally, the 
Committee analyzes reported cases to ascertain 
whether changes in professional standards are 
required.
■ Investigative Phases. The activities of the Commit­
tee consist of two distinct phases: an initial 
investigative phase and a special review phase. The 
initial investigative phase includes review of relevant 
public documents, discussions with appropriate rep­
resentatives of the accounting firm named in the 
litigation and other activities necessary to assess the 
implications of the allegations for the firm’s system of 
quality control. If future developments relating to the 
case are expected, such as the issuance of a report for 
a peer review in process, the issuance of a bankruptcy 
trustee’s report, or an action by a regulatory enforce­
ment agency, the files on the case are kept open in 
order to follow and evaluate such future 
developments.
A special review is a review of certain aspects 
of a firm’s quality control system, such as audit 
engagements performed for clients in a given industry, 
or engagements performed by a particular office or 
individual, or a specific element of the firm’s quality 
control system. Such a review involves application of 
procedures similar to those used in peer review. The 
Section requires that the cost of a special review be 
borne by the reviewed firm.
The objective of both phases is to reduce the 
possibility of future failure by (1) ascertaining whether 
deficiencies exist in the firm’s quality control system 
as alleged and (2) if so, requiring the firm to take 
appropriate corrective action.
■ Operation of the Committee. For each reported 
case, the member firm is required to provide the 
Committee with copies of the complaint, relevant 
financial statements, SEC or other regulatory filings, 
and, if requested, other relevant public documents. 
The staff of the Committee prepares a summary of 
the submitted data, identifying and evaluating the
accounting, auditing, and quality control issues in­
volved. Copies of all documents are sent to members 
assigned to the case and the staff summary is sent to 
all Committee members.
One or more Committee members are assigned 
by the chairman as a task force to analyze the 
complaint and other relevant documents to deter­
mine whether the situation suggests that there might 
be a shortcoming in the quality control system of the 
firm and to make recommendations to the Committee 
as to the action that should be taken. The task force 
applies the relevant prescribed initial investigative 
procedures designed to assist it in considering the 
nature of the allegations and their implications. In 
some cases, analysis of the complaint and the 
financial statements to which it relates permits the 
task force and Committee to conclude that the 
allegations are without merit. Many complaints, while 
stating legitimate claims against issuers, fall short, for 
a number of reasons, of stating a reasonable claim 
against the auditor, most stemming from a misunder­
standing of the scope of audit responsibility. In other 
cases, a discussion with representatives of the af­
fected firm of the quality control implications of the 
allegations and a review of the findings of the firm’s 
most recent peer review are sufficient to give the 
Committee assurance regarding the adequacy of the 
firm’s quality control system.
If this investigation of the allegations indicates 
that there may be serious deficiencies in the design 
of, or in compliance with, the firm’s quality control 
system, the Committee may order a special review of 
those aspects of the firm’s system that, if operating 
effectively, ordinarily should prevent or detect defi­
ciencies of the type alleged to have occurred. The 
Committee considers recent peer review and inspec­
tion findings in deciding whether there is a need for a 
special review. While it has not yet had the occasion 
to do so, the Committee can request authorization 
from the Executive Committee to review the audit 
workpapers of the specific alleged audit failure.
■ Basis for Closing Individual Files. A file is closed 
on a case with respect to the individual firm when the 
Committee concludes either that the allegations do 
not indicate the likelihood of a deficiency in the firm’s 
quality control system, or, if so, that the firm has taken 
appropriate action to correct such deficiencies so as 
to minimize the possibility of future failure.
If litigation suggests a problem with professional 
standards, the matter is referred to the appropriate 
standard-setting body of the AICPA.
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in accordance with applicable standards. Such re­
views are performed not only to evaluate the 
performance on the engagement in question but 
also to determine the effectiveness of the firm's 
quality control policies and procedures and to 
make such changes in them as appear appropri­
ate. This latter objective parallels that of the 
Committee, namely, that a member firm modify 
any aspect of its quality control system if such 
modification would be expected to minimize the 
possibility of a future engagement not being per­
formed in accordance with professional standards.
Corrective actions taken by member firms 
during 1984-85, either on their individual in i­
tiatives or after discussion with a Committee task 
force, included:
■ Reassignment of firm personnel and responsi­
bilities.
■ Development and presentation of, or participa­
tion in, specified continuing professional educa­
tion programs.
■ Closer supervision of, or concurring preissuance 
review of, work performed by specified indi­
viduals.
■ Performance of a special internal inspection of 
auditing and accounting assignments for clients in 
a given industry.
Policy in Closing Cases
As indicated, the Committee closed its 
files on 34 cases during the year ended June 30, 
1985. A file is closed when the Committee either 
(a) concludes that the allegations misstated the 
requirements of professional standards or did not 
indicate a need for changes in the firm's quality 
control system or (b) has obtained assurance that 
the firm has strengthened the quality control pol­
icies and procedures relevant to the issues in the 
case in litigation.
Other Actions Initiated by the Committee
In addition to assessing the allegations in- 
each case in terms of possible deficiencies in the 
reporting firm’s quality control system, the Com­
mittee considers whether the cases, either indi­
vidually or in the aggregate, indicate a deficiency
in professional standards o r  a need for additional 
guidance.
Several cases during the past year have 
prompted the Committee to refer specific matters 
to the profession’s standard-setting authorities:
■ The Auditing Standards Board was asked to 
reassess the adequacy of guidance regarding 
communications between successor and prede­
cessor auditors, especially in situations where the 
successor auditor intends to issue an unqualified 
opinion on financial statements that contain mate­
rial revisions to those opined on by the prede­
cessor auditor.
■ Several reported cases dealt with accounting 
for costs during construction of nuclear operating 
plants by public utilities. A Committee task force 
met with representatives of the AICPA Public 
Utilities Subcommittee to discuss the financial 
problems facing a number of utilities with such 
construction projects in progress and their im­
plications for accounting and auditing standards.
■ The Committee formally requested the AICPA 
Professional Ethics Executive Committee to issue 
a ruling as to whether an auditor's independence 
is impaired, in fact or in appearance, in a specific 
set of circumstances.
Several other issues were informally com­
municated at meetings held periodically between 
representatives of the Committee and the Audit­
ing Standards Board.
SEC Oversight of the Process
In May 1985, at the suggestion of the Board 
and others, the Section agreed that the activities 
of the Special Investigations Committee should 
be reported to the Securities and Exchange Com­
mission through the offices of the Board. Although 
details of this access arrangement have not yet 
been finalized, the SEC is to be provided informa­
tion about each closed case that will identify the 
company and firm in litigation, summarize the 
major allegations in the case, and relate the inves­
tigative procedures applied by the Committee, 
the results obtained therefrom, and the subse­
quent actions taken by the Committee and rea­
sons therefor. The SEC staff will also have access to 
work programs prepared by the staff of the Board.
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Membership Data
One thousand five hundred forty-nine firms are members of the Division for CPA Firms: 393 belong to both the SEC Practice Section and the Private Com­panies Practice Section, 10 belong only to the SEC 
Practice Section and 1,146 belong only to the Pri­
vate Companies Practice Section.
Membership in the Division continues to 
decline, a trend that has persisted since 1980 
when membership reached an all-time high of 
over 2,200 firms. After adjustment for mergers be­
tween member firms, the number of firms with 
membership in both sections declined by 19 dur­
ing the twelve months ended June 30, 1985, and 
the number of firms with membership in only the
Private Companies Practice Section declined by 
66. Details are shown in Table 5.
The fact that 217 firms withdrew from the 
Division—or had their membership terminated 
for noncompliance with membership require­
ments—continues to be a matter of concern. The 
Board is pleased to note, however, that the 
number of firms auditing one or more SEC regis­
trants declined by only six during the year ended 
June 30, 1985.
Analysis of membership records main­
tained by the Institute reveals that 103 firms that 
withdrew during the year had undergone one or 
more peer reviews during their term of mem­
bership. Eighty-eight of these firms (85%) had re-
TABLE 5 Analysis of Membership in the Division for CPA Firms by Number of SEC Clients and by Section—July 1, 1984 to 
June 30, 1985
Number of Firms Classified by 
Firms with and with no 
SEC Clients
Firms with one 
or more SEC 
clients
SECPS-only............... 7 — 7 — — 2 — 5
Both sections........... 189 4 185 4 (4) 5 (5) 175
PCPS-only................. 113 1 112 12 4 14 4 118
Totals...................
Firms with no 
SEC clients
309 5 304 16 21 (1) 298
SECPS-only............... 6 — 6 1 — 2 — 5
Both sections........... 228 1 227 4 — 18 5 218
PCPS-only................. 1,120 20 1,100 108 — 176  ( 4) 1,028
Totals.................. 1,354 21 1,333 113 — 196 1 1,251
All firms
SECPS-only............... 13 — 13 1 — 4 — 10
Both sections........... 417 5 412 8 (4) 23 — 393
PCPS-only................. 1,233 21 1,212 120 4 190 — 1,146
Totals.................. 1,663 26 1,637 129  217  1,549
*Of the five firms that were members of both sections, four merged with other firms that are members of both sections and one merged with a PCPS-only member. Of 
the 21 PCPS-only firms that merged, 19 merged with firms that are members of both sections and two merged with other PCPS-only members.
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TABLE 6 Analysis of Membership in the Division for CPA Firms— July 1, 1984 to June 30, 1985
Division for CPA Firms SEC Practice Section
Increase Increase
Classification ]uly 1, 1984 June 30, 1985 (Decrease) July 1 ,  1984 June 30, 1985 (Decrease)
No. of firms.............................. 1,637* 1,549 (88) 425* 403 (22)
No. of SEC audit c lients.........  11,543 13,070 1,527 11,366 12,862 1,496
No. of practice u n its ............... 3,742 3,639 (103) 1,974 1,996 22
No. of professionals................. 100,846 105,154 4,308 85,192 90,044 4,852
*Adjusted for mergers between member firms July 1, 1984 to June 30, 1985.
ceived an unqualified report on their most recent 
peer review.
While membership in terms of the number 
of firms that belong to the Section declined during 
the year, the number of SEC registrants4 audited 
by member firms and the number of professionals 
employed by member firms continue to increase. 
Details are shown in Table 6.
Auditors of Publicly-traded Companies
Firms that are members of the Division 
serve as auditors for the vast majority of com­
panies whose stocks are publicly traded. Member 
firms audit over 85 percent o f all public companies 
listed in the thirteenth edition of Who Audits Amer­
ica4. As shown in Chart D, these companies account 
for over 98 percent of the aggregate sales volume 
of all publicly-traded companies. The majority of 
these companies— 78 percent—are audited by 
firms that are entitled to a permanent seat on the 
Executive Committee of the SEC Practice Section; 
these companies account for 98 percent of the 
combined sales volume of all publicly-traded 
companies.
Members of the Division and their foreign 
affiliates audit all but two of the companies whose 
stocks are listed on the New York Stock Exchange, 
all but 19 of the companies whose stocks are listed 
on the American Stock Exchange, and approx­
imately 82 percent of the companies whose stocks 
are traded "over the counter.”
Changes in Membership Requirements
Public and Congressional interest in in­
stances of litigation alleging audit failure involving
non-SEC registrants caused the Executive Com­
m ittee to amend the Section’s membership 
requirements.
■ Litigation Reporting Requirement. In April 1985, 
the requirement for reporting litigation and cer­
tain other proceedings to the Special Investiga­
tions Committee was significantly expanded. In 
addition to reporting cases alleging deficiencies 
in the conduct of an audit of an SEC registrant, a 
member firm is now required to report cases alleg­
ing deficiencies in the conduct of an audit of the 
following "public interest” clients.
A bank or other lending institution that files 
periodic reports with the Comptroller of the Cur­
rency, the Federal Reserve System, the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation, or the Federal 
Home Loan Bank Board pursuant to section 12(i) 
of the Exchange Act.
A subsidiary or investee of an SEC registrant if 
the allegations relate to financial statements pre­
sented separately in parent and/or investor com­
pany reports.
A company whose financial statements appear 
in the annual report and/or proxy statement of an 
investment fund because it is a sponsor or man­
ager of such fund but which is not itself a registrant 
required to file financial statements periodically 
with a federal regulatory agency.
■ Other Requirements Applicable to Non-SEC 
"Public Interest” Audit Clients. In June 1985, the 
Executive Committee further amended the mem­
bership requirements to make the following rules 
applicable to the types of clients now covered by 
the "expanded litigation reporting requirement,” 
except for subsidiaries or investees:
4. The number of SEC registrants reported by member firms is considerably 
larger than the number of publicly-held clients listed in Who Audits America. 
13th ed. (Menlo Park, Calif: Data Financial Press, 1985). The primary reason 
for the difference is that Who Audits America generally does not include the 
following entities:
•  Closely-held oil/gas/real estate partnerships.
•  Wholly owned "financial" subsidiaries.
•  Employee stock plans.
•  Foreign based companies.
•  Companies in bankruptcy.
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□  A partner can serve as audit partner in charge 
of such engagement for a maximum of seven con­
secutive years.
□  A concurring review of the audit must be per­
formed by a partner other than the engagement 
partner.
□  Certain management advisory services may 
not be performed for such clients that are also 
audit clients.
The following matters must be reported to the 
audit committee or board of directors of such 
clients:
■ The amount of fees received for manage­
ment advisory services and the type of such 
services.
■ The nature of disagreements with the man­
agement of the client on financial accounting 
and reporting matters and auditing pro­
cedures, which, if not satisfactorily resolved, 
would have caused the issuance of a 
qualified auditor’s report.
The Division’s Public Information Program
In its 1983-84 annual report, the Board 
urged the Division to implement "a multi-faceted 
program intended to increase membership and 
better inform persons both within and outside the 
accounting profession about the program and the 
commitment to high quality service that mem­
bership in the Division represents.” Before the 
end of 1984, the Division—acting through the Joint
Coordinating Committee of the SEC and Private 
Companies Practice Sections— had engaged the 
public relations firm of Hill & Knowlton to assist in 
the development and implementation of a wide- 
ranging public information program.
Approximately 60 spokespersons have 
been identified and trained in presenting the Di­
vision’s message. There are five basic points in 
that message:
■ CPAs, as professionals, are committed to ex­
cellence.
■ Peer review is proof of that commitment.
■ Peer review reports are available to the public.
■ The business community should know about 
the Division’s program, ask firms if they belong, 
and review the firm’s peer review results.
■ Division members believe every firm that per­
forms audits should have the effectiveness of its 
quality control system periodically subjected to 
an independent peer review.
Information packages have been devel­
oped for the media, advertisements have been 
run in the Wall Street Journal and the American Banker, 
brochures have been developed on the peer re­
view process and the significance of membership, 
information on the Division has been sent to 
about 300 newspapers, editorial briefings have 
been conducted with media in major cities and 
numerous interviews, usually with articles result­
ing, have been held.
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CHART D. Analysis of Firms that Audit the 10,230 Publicly-traded Companies Listed in the Thirteenth Edition of Who Audits 
America
8,030 companies (78.50%) with aggregate sales of
$4,077,464 million (98.09%) are audited by firms with permanent seats on the 
SECPS Executive Committee.
573 companies (5.60%) with aggregate sales of
$19,448. million (0.46%) are audited by other SECPS members.
179 companies (1.75%) with aggregate sales of 
$2,186 million (0.05%) are audited by PCPS-only firms.
84 companies (0.82%) with aggregate sales of 
$43,638 million (1.05%) are audited by foreign firms.
87 companies (0.85%) with aggregate sales of
$1,552 million (0.04%) are audited by firms not identified.
1,277 companies (12.48%) with aggregate sales of 
$12,691 million (0.31%) are audited by U.S. firms 
not members of the Division.
Number of
Publicly-traded Companies
Annual Sales of 
Publicly-traded Companies
(Millions of Dollars)
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Board Conclusions and Commentary
A s indicated in earlier sections of this re­
port, the Board concludes, based on 
 its oversight activities, that both the 
  peer review and special investigative 
processes are achieving their intended objec­
tives. Both are upgrading the quality of accounting 
and auditing practice by reviewing the work of 
member firms, critiquing it, and compelling firms 
to strengthen their procedures where considered 
necessary. Both processes have benefited by re­
vision of standards and procedures suggested by 
reviewers, members of the Section’s committees 
and their staffs, and Board members.
Testimony offered at the on-going Con­
gressional hearings strongly indicates that the 
profession needs to increase the efforts to inform 
its various publics about the expanded self-reg­
ulatory program and to make clear the difference 
between a business failure and an audit failure. In 
addition, the hearings suggest that the Section 
should reevaluate the policies and procedures 
that cause misperceptions or whose objectives 
are being misinterpreted.
The profession must address itself to the 
problems caused by the changing environment, 
which were addressed by Chairman Wood in his 
recent address to AICPA Council (see Exhibit 1), 
two of which are commented on below.
Price Competition and MAS
The Board, through its oversight programs, 
has gained confidence that auditors perform audit 
assignments objectively. However, the increasing 
emphasis on management advisory services by 
member firms causes perception problems that 
demand the attention of the profession. The as­
sertion is heard with increasing frequency that 
auditing is regarded as a commodity and that 
some CPA firms quote very low audit fees— i.e., 
use the audit as a "loss leader”— in order to gain 
new clients and reap the rewards of profitable
MAS engagements. Moreover, persistent and in­
tensive price competition for audit services is in­
terpreted by many as proof that the problem is 
more than one of perception.
An analysis of fee data reported by the 25 
largest member firms reveals that:
■ Four years ago, the range of MAS fees to total 
fees was 1 percent to 25 percent and the median 
percentage was 10 percent, i.e., half the firms re­
ceived total MAS fees that were 10 percent or 
more of total fees.
■ Currently, the range of MAS fees to total fees is 1 
percent to 38 percent and the median is 13 per­
cent, i.e., half the firms received total MAS fees 
that are 13 percent or more of total fees.
Thus, while fees for MAS engagements still 
represent a modest percentage of total fees, the 
trend of MAS fees is upward. The data reported 
does not permit a conclusion as to what portion of 
MAS fees are received from audit clients; it may 
be that a significant portion of MAS fees are for 
engagements performed for nonaudit clients. The 
Board has suggested to the Executive Committee 
that firms be required to report MAS fees in two 
classifications: MAS fees from audit clients and 
MAS fees from nonaudit clients.
Nevertheless, the perception problem 
persists. In its March 1979 report on "Scope of 
Services by CPA Firms,” the Board stated its belief 
that certain MAS services—for example, those re­
lating to the internal accounting control systems of 
clients—were natural opportunities of service for 
CPA firms to perform. However, it also urged the 
profession and individual firms to exercise mod­
eration in the expansion of MAS services. It ap­
pears that CPA firms continue to expand their MAS 
departments and now offer services in areas 
which may have little or no relationship to the 
traditional services performed by auditing firms.
The Board has suggested an independent 
study to ascertain the extent to which the larger
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firms have expanded the scope of MAS and how 
such expansion has affected the public percep­
tion of the auditor and the credibility of the au­
ditor’s report.
Opinion Shopping
In the light of the ever-increasing complex­
ity of business transactions, it is not uncommon for 
management to seek second opinions on how a 
certain transaction might be reported in financial 
statements. Some managements, more con­
cerned with attaining a predetermined financial 
reporting objective than with reporting economic 
realities, seek an accounting treatment that per­
mits them to achieve the predetermined objec­
tive. If their auditor does not condone such 
treatment, and if accounting literature does not 
specifically proscribe such reporting, some man­
agements have been known to "shop" for an 
auditor who will concur with management’s pro­
posed accounting treatment.
The SEC has stated that it believes the 
number of companies engaging in "opinion shop­
ping” is increasing. In a recently issued accounting 
and auditing enforcement release, it warned man­
agements of public companies and accounting 
firms that such practice "erodes the public’s belief 
in the integrity of both the financial markets and 
the independent audit function.”
The Board concurs with this view and 
Chairman Wood has urged the profession "to snuff 
out [this] insidious practice.” Strict adherence to 
the AICPA’s Rules of Conduct, which require a 
member to consult with the inquirer’s auditor in 
such situations so as to be made aware of all the 
facts relevant to the opinion requested, should 
minimize the number of times that opinion shop­
pers are accommodated.
The Board understands that the Section, 
based on the report of its Task Force on Profes­
sionalism, is considering adoption of several addi­
tional membership requirements. One would 
require each firm to adopt and publish an indi­
vidual code of conduct and require and enforce 
adherence to such code. Another proposed re­
quirement would be the establishment within 
each firm of a rule requiring a partner to consult 
with appropriate sources within the firm before 
expressing an opinion in response to inquiries 
about accounting matters that would have a sig­
nificant influence on financial statements— re­
gardless of whether such opinion is requested by 
a client or nonclient—and that such consultation 
be adequately documented. Compliance with 
these membership requirements would be sub­
ject to peer review.
The Board encourages adoption of such 
requirements.
Proxy Statement Disclosure re: Auditing Firm
In July 1985, the Securities and Exchange 
Commission issued a release that proposes proxy 
statement disclosure of whether the registrant’s 
auditing firm is a member "of a voluntary self- 
regulatory organization which has a peer review 
program and an independent oversight function, 
both of which are subject to review by the Com­
mission.” Based on its oversight of the Section’s 
program, the Board believes that the peer review 
process is constructive and has improved the 
quality of accounting and auditing practice of 
member firms. Since the Board believes that all 
auditing firms, especially those that audit pub­
licly-held companies, should subject their quality 
control systems to independent review peri­
odically, the Board favors adoption of the SEC’s 
proposed proxy statement disclosure.
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An Introduction to Board Members
The Public Oversight Board was first appointed in 1978. Eight persons have served on the 
Board since its inception. The following were members of the 1984-85 Board:
ARTHUR M. WOOD, Chairman, is a charter member of the POB and 
served as vice chairman from 1982 until 1984. Mr. Wood served as 
chairman of the board and chief executive officer of Sears, Roebuck 
and Co. from February 1, 1973 until his retirement on January 31, 1978. 
He joined Sears in 1946 to organize the company’s law division and 
served the company in several other capacities, including secretary, 
vice president and controller, territorial vice-president, and presi­
dent. He was a director of Sears and several other companies. He 
has a distinguished record of public service, including two presiden­
tial boards and trusteeships at the University of Chicago, the 
California Institute of Technology, the Art Institute of Chicago, and 
Rush-Presbyterian-St. Luke’s Medical Center in Chicago.
An audit committee of the American corporation should play a major 
role in assuring the board of directors— and the shareholders— that the 
audit is complete and unfettered by pressure from management. An 
audit committee can inform itself of the quality control system of the audit 
firm by requesting access to the latest peer review records at the AICPA 
offices in New York. Self-regulation begins at the corporate level.
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A. A. SOMMER, JR., Vice Chairman, joined the Board in 1982 and was 
elected vice chairman in March 1985. Mr. Sommer served as 
commissioner of the SEC from 1973 to 1976 and is currently a partner 
in the Washington, D.C. law firm of Morgan, Lewis & Bockius, 
specializing in securities law He is a member of a host of legal and 
civic organizations and has actively served such organizations in 
various capacities, such as advisor, trustee, and committee chairman 
and member. He is a member of several boards of directors and 
serves on a number of advisory boards. He is a frequent lecturer on 
corporate, securities, and accounting subjects and has authored more 
than forty articles which have been published in several prestigious 
law reviews and business publications.
There is no foolproof system that will guarantee detection of all errors in a 
set of financial statements. However, the fact that an auditing firm has 
submitted its quality control system to critical review by peers affords a 
higher level of public assurance regarding the quality of its accounting 
and auditing services than any other regulatory device we know.
JOHN D. HARPER was a charter member of the Board. Mr. Harper 
served as chairman of the board of the Aluminum Company of 
America from 1970 to 1975, was chairman of its executive committee 
from 1975 until his retirement in 1977, and was a member of its board 
of directors until his untimely death. He had recently retired as 
chairman of Communications Satellite Corp., was a member of a 
presidential commission, several boards of directors, business and 
university organizations, and civic and social groups.
The profession should concern itself with maintaining the public's 
perception of the independence of the auditor. Continuing expansion 
of management advisory services to audit clients can compromise 
this perception. The profession should consider moderating principles 
and procedures to keep its primary emphasis on auditing 
financial statements. Self-discipline and restraint would be the best 
remedies.
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MELVIN R. LAIRD became a member of the Board in August 1984.
Mr. Laird served as Representative in the U.S. Congress from 
Wisconsin for nine terms, as Secretary of Defense from 1969 to 1973, 
and as Counsellor to the President for Domestic Affairs from 1973 
through 1974. He is a member of several corporate boards of 
directors and over sixty boards of directors of civic organizations. He 
has received many honors, including the U.S. Medal of Freedom, the 
Order of Merit (Federal Republic of Germany), the Legion of Honor 
(France), Man of Year Awards by the American Cancer Society and 
National Association for Mental Health, and the Military Order of the 
Purple Heart. He currently serves as a senior counsellor for National 
and International Affairs for the Reader’s Digest Association.
" The profession, and in particular the Section, need to better articulate the 
difference between business and audit failure, or the public— and some 
members of Congress as well— will continue to read the newspaper and 
magazine accounts of business failures and wonder where the auditors 
were."
ROBERT K. MAUTZ joined the Board in 1981. Mr. Mautz is professor 
emeritus of the University of Illinois and the University of Michigan. 
He is a member of the Accounting Hall of Fame, past president of 
the American Accounting Association, and a former editor of the 
Accounting Review. He has been awarded the Gold Medal, the AICPA’s 
highest honor, and the American Accounting Association’s Outstand­
ing Accounting Educator Award. He is a renowned author of 
textbooks and technical articles. His list of service contributions 
includes member of the AICPA Committee on Auditing Procedure, 
AICPA Council and Board of Directors, Commission to Study the 
Common Body of Knowledge for CPAs, Cost Accounting Standards 
Board, Financial Accounting Standards Advisory Council, and chair­
man of the Governmental Accounting Standards Board Organization 
Committee.
Unlike government regulation, self-regulation, properly performed, assures 
continually improving service to the public because its emphasis is on 
remedy and prevention. If is in closer touch with practice, more aware of 
changing conditions, and more responsive to the needs of those who use 
the service than any other form of regulation can be."
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The Board is deeply indebted to 
three distinguished former members:
JOHN J. McCLOY, who served as chairman from inception until his 
resignation in early 1984. Mr. McCloy has had an illustrious career and 
public service record. He served as Assistant Secretary of War during 
World War II, High Commissioner of Germany, president of the World 
Bank and chairman of Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., and as senior 
partner in the New York law firm, Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy. 
The AICPA has presented its Medal of Honor—the highest award the 
accounting profession can bestow on non-CPAs—to Mr. McCloy in 
recognition of his significant contribution to the profession and the 
public it serves.
RAY GARRETT, JR., who served as vice chairman from inception until 
his untimely death in 1980. Mr. Garrett served as chairman of the 
Securities and Exchange Commission from August 1973 until October
1975. From 1954 to 1958 he served on the staff of the Commission, 
serving for most of that period as director of the Division of 
Corporate Regulation. Both prior to and after his tours of duty with 
the SEC, he was a partner in the Chicago law firm of Gardner, Carton 
& Douglas. He was an active member of the American Bar 
Association and served as chairman of several of its committees. In
1976, he was appointed a governor-at-large of the National Associa­
tion of Security Dealers and was also a director of the American 
Arbitration Association.
WILLIAM L. CARY, who served as a member from inception until his 
resignation for health reasons in 1982. Mr. Cary was Dwight Professor 
of Law at Columbia University and served as chairman of the SEC 
from 1961 to 1964. Previously, he served on the SEC staff and held 
other government positions both in this country and abroad. He also 
served as counsel to the New York law firm, Patterson, Belknap, Webb 
& Tyler, and authored several books on law and government.
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STATEMENTS IN
QUOTES
What must be done: 
a report from the POB
A “bold rethinking o f its role’’ 
must be undertaken by the 
accounting profession ‘‘to restore 
public confidence.’’ That message 
was delivered to the American 
Institute o f CPAs governing 
council by Arthur M. Wood, 
chairman o f the Public Oversight 
Board o f the SEC practice section 
o f the AICPA division for CPA 
firms. Wood discusses specific 
areas for reconsideration in this 
adaptation o f his presentation at 
last May's council meeting in 
Scottsdale, Arizona.
This is a critical time in the history 
of the accounting profession. To be­
lieve that the crisis exists because of 
the hearings being held by the 
House Subcommittee on Oversight 
and Investigations is in my estima­
tion a serious error. Congressman 
Dingell’s hearings are a symptom, 
not a cause. The cause of this crisis 
is the fact that investors and deposi­
tors are losing faith in the ability of 
the accounting profession to per­
form the job that has historically 
been its unique function: assuring 
the integrity of the financial infor­
mation on which our capitalistic so­
ciety depends.
CPAs are members of a profes­
sion that has had a long and honor­
able history in this country. They 
are critical, indispensable elements 
of any economy that depends on pri­
vate capital. Without the work they 
do, savers would be reluctant to in­
vest in private enterprises, particu­
larly in equity investments or in any 
but the most established enter­
prises.
In response to demands made by 
society on the profession, it has, 
over the years, expended vast 
amounts of time and money to ar­
ticulate sound accounting principles 
that maximize uniformity in ac­
counting and comparability among 
enterprises. Considerable effort has 
been devoted to developing and re­
fining auditing techniques and skills
to lend greater credibility to the at­
test function and to auditors’ opin­
ions.
The Public Oversight Board 
(POB), which I chair, is one evi­
dence of this conscientious effort to 
provide the public with the assur­
ances they expect from CPAs. I 
trust it will not be seen as self-serv­
ing if I say that this effort has been 
highly successful and is a credit to 
the insight and determination of the 
leadership that brought the Ameri­
can Institute of CPAs division for 
CPA firms into existence. We so 
testified before Congressman Din­
gell’s committee. My belief, shared 
by my fellow board members, is 
that the peer review system is a suc­
cess. It has lifted the quality of audit 
practice in this country perceptibly, 
and that can be said of the sole prac­
titioner as well as of the nation’s 
largest accounting firms.
But puzzlingly, notwithstanding 
the enormous emphasis placed by 
the profession on quality audits, 
notwithstanding the creation of the 
division for CPA firms, notwith­
standing the thousands upon thou­
sands of hours that have generously 
been given to make this system a 
success, the profession is again un­
der public scrutiny and is subject to 
criticism based on a number of sen­
sational, far-reaching and very un­
fortunate cases in which the public 
accounting profession appears to its 
critics and others to have failed its 
public responsibility.
It is not my purpose to dwell on 
charges curren tly  being made 
against the profession. Rather, I 
would like to express the percep­
tions of my fellow board members 
and myself about what must be done 
if the profession is to regain public 
confidence and, in the course of 
that, perhaps its own self-confi­
dence.
Beyond quality control 
and peer review
Let me start with a disquieting ob­
servation. As far as we can tell at 
the moment, all of the audits under 
scrutiny by Congressman Dingell’s 
subcommittee, or that are expected 
to come under scrutiny, were per­
formed by firms that have never re­
ceived anything but clean opinions 
in their peer reviews. True, some of 
those firms have received letters of 
comment, but none has received an 
adverse or negative opinion.
Why is this disquieting? Because 
it demonstrates that, valuable as the 
quality control and peer review sys­
tems are, they are not guarantees 
that a firm always does work in ac­
cordance with standards. More im­
portant, it suggests that we cannot 
take much comfort from the statistic 
that the overwhelming majority of 
member firms conduct their prac­
tices in accordance with the stan­
dards established by the AICPA, 
the division for CPA firms and the 
SEC practice section (SECPS). And 
that, in turn, suggests that as we 
contemplate changes necessary to 
carry out the responsibility placed 
on the profession, we should not 
limit our horizon to the peer review 
system, but rather should look be­
yond it and range freely among the 
practices that exist in the profes­
sion. As we examine those prac­
tices, they may suggest some 
changes in the quality control sys­
tem, but they may also suggest 
changes of a more fundamental na­
ture.
Restoring public confidence 
It was the hope of the profession in 
1978 when the division for CPA 
firms was founded that if the pro­
gram succeeded it would remove 
once and for all the prospect of leg­
islative controls and be a giant step 
in regaining public confidence. Yet 
now, less than a decade later, the 
profession is once more under 
fire— if anything, more intense than 
it was subjected to eight years ago.
The repair job cannot be accom­
plished this time with a new struc­
ture, a new system, a new device. It 
can be done only if the profession is 
willing to undertake a bold rethink­
ing of its role and has the will to 
make necessary changes to restore 
public confidence in the auditor’s 
opinion.
This is already beginning to hap­
pen. The AICPA now has a major 
effort under way to examine the 
long-accepted proposition— long 
accepted in the profession but not 
by the public—that audits are not 
designed or likely to detect fraud.
The public is shocked that man­
agement fraud goes undetected by 
those best qualified to root it out. 
We applaud the effort to examine 
this problem undertaken by the In­
stitute and other organizations. In 
this connection it may be fruitful for 
the profession to require the auditor 
in each engagement to make a 
meaningful assessment of the qual­
ity of the internal control system 
and to communicate to the audit 
committee his or her findings on its 
scope, procedures and personnel.
Confidentiality and the SIC 
A second area for major reconsider­
ation is the confidentiality require­
ment imposed on the activities of 
the special investigations commit­
tee (SIC).
The SIC was established in late 
1979. At that time it was universally 
believed that the confidentiality 
provision had to be incorporated in 
the charter document if it was to 
gain the support of the majority of 
the accounting profession. Thus, 
procedures were adopted to ensure 
the confidentiality of committee ac­
tivities. Other than members of the 
SIC and its staff, only the POB has 
access to committee proceedings.
The board and the SECPS have 
strictly observed the confidentiality 
provisions of the SIC charter. How­
ever, the price being paid for that 
confidentiality is high indeed. As 
long as no one outside the commit­
tee or the POB knows what the 
committee is doing on individual 
cases or understands the bases of its 
decisions, the self-regulatory pro­
gram will never gain the credibility 
it deserves.
The POB believes that the Secu­
rities and Exchange Commission 
should be given access to the SIC 
process to permit the SEC to form 
an independent opinion about the 
process. If this were done, we be­
lieve that the SEC would publicly 
state, as it has with respect to the 
peer review process, that the special 
investigative process is effective 
and is achieving its intended objec­
tive. I am pleased that earnest ef­
forts are under way to provide the 
commission with the opportunity 
for fuller insight into the work of the 
SIC; I earnestly hope that they will 
culminate in a modus operandi that 
will satisfy the legitimate needs of 
the SEC and avoid unduly alarming 
members of the section.
Can the SIC perform its functions 
satisfactorily without some access 
to cases in litigation? None of us at
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the POB advocates establishing the 
enormous structure that would be 
necessary to permit the board or the 
SECPS to determine if an individual 
or firm had been guilty of miscon­
duct in performing an audit. As 
members of the board have repeat­
edly said, without subpoena power 
any such inquiry would pose the 
danger of inflicting grave injustice 
on persons and firms.
However, that belief does not 
justify the continuation of many of 
the limitations that surround the ac­
tivities of the SIC. Among those 
limitations is the one that precludes 
the committee, in seeking to deter­
mine whether the litigation that oc­
casions the inquiry indicates quality 
control deficiencies, from making 
any investigation of the very audit 
that is the subject of the litigation. 
This limitation stems, in my estima­
tion, from fear on the part of firms 
that such an inquiry might in some 
fashion prejudice them in litigation, 
even though its purpose and thrust 
would not be to pass judgment on 
the audit.
We have no desire to put the SIC 
in the position of determining guilt 
or responsibility in individual 
cases. We do think it may be neces­
sary to permit it to discover what 
really occurred with sufficient accu­
racy and reliability so it can as­
sess the effectiveness of the firm’s 
quality controls in the specific sit­
uation that gave rise to the litiga­
tion.
Second partner review 
Second partner review is another 
matter that warrants immediate at­
tention. At present, the SECPS’s 
membership requirement on second 
partner review applies only to audits 
of SEC registrants.
It is somewhat difficult to explain 
to skeptical congressmen why the 
audits of financial institutions 
whose recent failures have had vast 
repercussions in financial circles 
are not considered  im portant 
enough to be subject to this require­
ment of the section. I would think 
that the audit of any financial insti­
tution or organization of more than 
modest size should be subject to the 
requirements of second partner re­
view, in addition to all other mem­
bership requirements applicable to 
SEC registrants.
The scope of such review also 
should be more precisely defined, 
including the requirement that “ key 
area” work papers be examined, to 
give the firm even greater assurance 
that the engagement was performed 
in accordance with professional 
standards.
“ Opinion shopping”  and 
bent principles
Another by-product of today’s in­
tensely competitive economy is the 
tendency of some corporate manag­
ers to jettison an auditor thought to 
be too conservative or too rigid and 
to find one more pliable. No re­
spectable professional counten­
ances this; still SEC complaints pro­
vide ev idence  tha t there  are 
members of the profession who do 
not blanch at the opportunity to gain 
a client, even if it means bending a 
principle.
The ideal solution to this, of 
course, is a heightened sense of pro­
fessionalism. Sadly, that has not 
been sufficient to snuff out the in­
sidious practice of “ opinion shop­
ping.’’ Thus, I think it is imperative 
that the peer review process be 
amended to require appropriate
documentation that firms, for first­
time audits, made appropriate in­
quiry of the predecessor auditor and 
examined its work papers, and re­
viewers should be permitted to 
make whatever inquiries of the pre­
decessor they believe appropriate.
MAS: discipline and restraint 
Finally, I call to your attention the 
concern of the Dingell committee 
about the effect on auditor indepen­
dence of the performance of man­
agement advisory services for audit 
clients. The POB's report on Scope 
o f Services by CPA Firms issued in 
March 1979 stated:
“ [T]here is enough concern 
about the scope of services in re­
sponsible quarters so that the ques­
tions cannot be dismissed as a ‘non- 
problem.’ The Board believes that 
there is potential danger to the pub­
lic interest and to the profession in 
the unlimited expansion of MAS to 
audit clients, and some moderating 
principles and procedures are need­
ed.”
Apparently, our call for modera­
tion has gone unheeded, for we con­
tinue to read announcements by 
CPA firms offering consulting ser­
vices that extend their MAS activi­
ties into such areas as consumer re­
search, site evaluation, media mar­
ket research, distribution planning 
and design, store operations, oper­
ations improvem ent programs, 
manpower planning and control, 
materials management— the list 
seems endless.
Again, self-discipline and re­
straint would be the best remedies; 
absent those—and they do appear to 
be absent— I would urge that the 
POB’s work in the late 1970s in re­
viewing this activity be updated.
While fees for MAS still repre­
sent a modest percentage of total 
fees earned by firms, the trend is 
clearly in the direction of increasing 
reliance on this revenue. We hear 
today the assertion that some CPA 
firms consider auditing to be a com­
modity. They are using the audit as 
a “ loss leader” in order to reap the 
rewards of profitable MAS engage­
ments. The intensive price competi­
tion for audit services in which the 
profession is now engaged is inter­
preted by many as proof that the 
assertion must be fact. These per­
ceptions demand serious attention 
by the profession.
A harbinger of regulation 
The members of the POB are fully 
committed to the belief that the ac­
counting profession and the nation 
are best served by a system of self­
regulation and that there is no need 
for further federal regulation. I 
would be less than candid, howev­
er, if I did not express our concern 
that a failure to come to grips with 
the problems discussed above, and 
others as well, will be the harbinger 
of a measure of regulation that can 
only stifle innovation, competition, 
opportunity and professionalism.
The profession is divided in its 
counsels. It must forego its differ­
ences, recognize the crisis and act in 
unity to defeat it. We share a con­
viction that the solution to the faults 
in financial reporting does not lie in 
more regulation. The solution lies 
within the profession. ■
Reprinted from the August 1985 issue of the Journal of Accountancy
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SEC PRACTICE SECTION
E xecutive C o m m ittee
Member Firm Affiliation
John W. Zick, Chairman 
John D. Abernathy, III 
George L. Bernstein 
Mario J. Formichella 
James O. Glauser 
C lifford E. Graese 
Howard Groveman 
Clarence D. Hein 
Eli Hoffman 
Charles Kaiser, Jr. 
Robert L. May 
J. Curt M ingle 
Robert D. Neary 
James J. Quinn 
Edward A. Reinerio 
Stanley G. Russell, Jr. 
M illa rd  E. Smith 
John A. Thom pson 
Jack C. Wahlig 
M ichael A. Walker 
Donald P. Zima
* Price Waterhouse 
*Seidman & Seidman 
* Laventhol & Horwath 
‘ A rthur Young & Company 
Baird Kurtz & Dobson 
* Peat, Marwick, M itche ll & Co. 
*Alexander Grant & Company 
Hein +  Associates 
J. H. Cohn & Company 
Pannell Kerr Forster 
*A rthur Andersen & Co.
Clifton Gunderson & Co.
* Ernst &  W hinney 
*Coopers & Lybrand 
Johnson Grant & Co.
*Touche Ross & Co.
* D e lo itte  Haskins & Sells 
*KMG Main Hurdman 
* McGladrey, Hendrickson &  Pullen 
*Mann Judd Landau 
May Zima &  Co.
* Firm entitled to permanent seat because firm audits 30 or more registrants under section 12 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
Peer Review Committee
Edward J. O’Grady, Chairman 
Thomas E. Byrne, Jr.
Michael A. Conway 
Marvin Feller 
Robert E. Fleming 
David B. Greer 
Robert H. Haas 
Daniel J. Moylan 
David A. Nelson 
David B. Pearson 
Emile L. Provost, Jr.
Joseph A. Puglisi 
Joe D. Ratliff 
Prentice N. Ursery 
Frank H. Whitehand
Special Investigations Committee
Laventhol & Horwath 
Price Waterhouse 
Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. 
Ernst & Whinney 
Urbach Kahn & Werlin, PC 
DeMiller, Denny, Word & Co. 
Coopers & Lybrand 
Deloitte Haskins & Sells 
McGladrey, Hendrickson & Pullen 
Arthur Young & Company 
H. J. Lowe & Company 
Touche Ross & Co.
Hollis McClain & Howell, Ltd. 
Pannell Kerr Forster 
Arthur Andersen & Co.
Robert A. Mellin, Chairman 
Mark J. Feingold 
Edwin P. Fisher* * *
John J. Fox*
Gerald E. Gorans 
Leroy Layton * * *
Leon P. Otkiss* * *
David Wentworth* * * 
Joseph A. Zulfer
Hood and Strong 
Laventhol & Horwath 
Arthur Andersen & Co.
Coopers & Lybrand 
Touche Ross & Co.
KMG Main Hurdman 
Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. 
McGladrey, Hendrickson & Pullen 
Ernst & Whinney
*Retired.
* Effective October 1985, these members will have exhausted their six-year e lig ib ility  for service on the committee in accordance with the section's existing 
regulations.
Public Oversight Board 
540 Madison Avenue 
New York, N.Y. 10022
